Ideas from 'The Rediscovery of the Mind' by John Searle [1992], by Theme Structure

[found in 'The Rediscovery of the Mind' by Searle,John R. [MIT 1999,0-262-69154-x]].

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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Correspondence to the facts HAS to be the aim of enquiry
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Reduction can be of things, properties, ideas or causes
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Solidity in a piston is integral to its structure, not supervenient [Maslin]
Is supervenience just causality? [Maslin]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 5. Physicalism
Reality is entirely particles in force fields
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
Some properties depend on components, others on their relations
Fully 'emergent' properties contradict our whole theory of causation
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
Beliefs only make sense as part of a network of other beliefs
Beliefs are part of a network, and also exist against a background
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Perception is a function of expectation
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
Memory is mainly a guide for current performance
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
We don't have a "theory" that other people have minds
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy
Other minds are not inferred by analogy, but are our best explanation
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
We experience unity at an instant and across time
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
The mind experiences space, but it is not experienced as spatial
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
Conscious creatures seem able to discriminate better
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
Unconscious thoughts are those capable of causing conscious ones
Consciousness results directly from brain processes, not from some intermediary like information
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Either there is intrinsic intentionality, or everything has it
Water flowing downhill can be described as if it had intentionality
Intentional phenomena only make sense within a background
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Consciousness is essential and basic to intentionality
Intentionality is defined in terms of representation
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
Pain is not intentional, because it does not represent anything beyond itself
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
Neither introspection nor privileged access makes sense
Introspection is just thinking about mental states, not a special sort of vision
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
I cannot observe my own subjectivity
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Mind and brain don't interact if they are the same
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
Without internal content, a zombie's full behaviour couldn't be explained
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Mental states only relate to behaviour contingently, not necessarily
Wanting H2O only differs from wanting water in its mental component
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Functionalists like the externalist causal theory of reference
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
A program for Chinese translation doesn't need to understand Chinese
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
If we are computers, who is the user?
Computation presupposes consciousness
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
Property dualism is the reappearance of Cartesianism
Property dualists tend to find the mind-body problem baffling
Consciousness is a brain property as liquidity is a water property
Property dualism denies reductionism
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Mind and brain are supervenient in respect of cause and effect
If mind-brain supervenience isn't causal, this implies epiphenomenalism
Mental events can cause even though supervenient, like the solidity of a piston
Upwards mental causation makes 'supervenience' irrelevant
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
Consciousness seems indefinable by conditions or categories
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Can the homunculus fallacy be beaten by recursive decomposition?
Searle argues that biology explains consciousness, but physics won't explain biology [Kriegel/Williford]
If mind is caused by brain, does this mean mind IS brain?
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
If mind is multiply realisable, it is possible that anything could realise it
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
We don't postulate folk psychology, we experience it
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / b. Turing Machines
Computation isn't a natural phenomenon, it is a way of seeing phenomena
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Content is much more than just sentence meaning
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
There is no such thing as 'wide content'
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
We explain behaviour in terms of actual internal representations in the agent
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Meaning is derived intentionality
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
Philosophy of language is a branch of philosophy of mind
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 1. Syntax
Universal grammar doesn't help us explain anything
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
Shared Background makes translation possible, though variation makes it hard
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 2. Values / i. Successful function
The function of a heart depends on what we want it to do
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
Chemistry entirely explains plant behaviour
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Mind involves fighting, fleeing, feeding and fornicating
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
You can only know the limits of knowledge if you know the other side of the limit