Ideas from 'Rationality in Action' by John Searle [2001], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Rationality in Action' by Searle,John R. [MIT 2001,0-262-19463-5]].

green numbers give full details    |     back to texts     |     expand these ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Entailment and validity are relations, but inference is a human activity
Theory involves accepting conclusions, and so is a special case of practical reason
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
Rationality is the way we coordinate our intentionality
Rationality is built into the intentionality of the mind, and its means of expression
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
If complex logic requires rules, then so does basic logic
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
In real reasoning semantics gives validity, not syntax
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
Users of 'supervenience' blur its causal and constitutive meanings
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
A belief is a commitment to truth
We can't understand something as a lie if beliefs aren't commitment to truth
Our beliefs are about things, not propositions (which are the content of the belief)
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
Thinking must involve a self, not just an "it"
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
In the past people had a reason not to smoke, but didn't realise it
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events)
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 2. Persons as Responsible
Being held responsible for past actions makes no sense without personal identity
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 3. Persons as Reasoners
Giving reasons for action requires reference to a self
A 'self' must be capable of conscious reasonings about action
An intentional, acting, rational being must have a self
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
Action requires a self, even though perception doesn't
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 1. Self and Consciousness
Selfs are conscious, enduring, reasonable, active, free, and responsible
A self must at least be capable of consciousness
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 5. Self as Associations
The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
Rational decision making presupposes free will
Free will is most obvious when we choose between several reasons for an action
We freely decide whether to make a reason for action effective
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
Preferences can result from deliberation, not just precede it
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
We don't accept practical reasoning if the conclusion is unpalatable
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Only an internal reason can actually motivate the agent to act
The essence of humanity is desire-independent reasons for action
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
If it is true, you ought to believe it
If this is a man, you ought to accept similar things as men
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 3. Promise Keeping
Promises hold because I give myself a reason, not because it is an institution
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
'Ought' implies that there is a reason to do something