Ideas from 'Proper Names' by John Searle [1958], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Philosophical Logic' (ed/tr Strawson,P.F.) [OUP 1973,0-19-875004-8]].

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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Reference for proper names presupposes a set of uniquely referring descriptions
Proper names are logically connected with their characteristics, in a loose way
We don't normally think of names as having senses (e.g. we don't give definitions of them)
How can a proper name be correlated with its object if it hasn't got a sense?
'Aristotle' means more than just 'an object that was christened "Aristotle"'