Ideas from 'The Metaphysics of Causation' by Jonathan Schaffer [2007], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy' (ed/tr Stanford University) [ ,-]].

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5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Logical form can't dictate metaphysics, as it may propose an undesirable property
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Facts / b. Types of fact
There is only one fact - the True
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
In causation there are three problems of relata, and three metaphysical problems
Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions
Causation may not be transitive; the last event may follow from the first, but not be caused by it
There are at least ten theories about causal connections
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Causation can't be a process, because a process needs causation as a primitive
Causation transcends nature, because absences can cause things
Causation may not be a process, if a crucial part of the process is 'disconnected'
A causal process needs to be connected to the effect in the right way
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
At least four rivals have challenged the view that causal direction is time direction
Causal order is not temporal, because of time travel, and simultanous, joint or backward causes
Causal order must be temporal, or else causes could be blocked, and time couldn't be explained
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 6. Causation as primitive
Causation is primitive; it is too intractable and central to be reduced; all explanations require it
If causation is just observables, or part of common sense, or vacuous, it can't be primitive
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
Causation is utterly essential for numerous philosophical explanations
The notion of causation allows understanding of science, without appearing in equations
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
If two different causes are possible in one set of circumstances, causation is primitive
If causation is primitive, it can be experienced in ourselves, or inferred as best explanation
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Causal relata are events - or facts, features, tropes, states, situations or aspects
Events are fairly course-grained (just saying 'hello'), unlike facts (like saying 'hello' loudly)
One may defend three or four causal relata, as in 'c causes e rather than e*'
If causal relata must be in nature and fine-grained, neither facts nor events will do
The relata of causation (such as events) need properties as explanation, which need causation!
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
Our selection of 'the' cause is very predictable, so must have a basis
Selecting 'the' cause must have a basis; there is no causation without such a selection
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation
The actual cause may make an event less likely than a possible more effective cause
All four probability versions of causation may need causation to be primitive