Ideas from 'Metaphysics: the logical approach' by José A. Benardete [1989], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Metaphysics: The Logical Approach' by Benardete,José A. [OUP 1989,0-19-289203-7]].

Click on the Idea Number for the full details    |     back to texts     |     expand these ideas


1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics focuses on Platonism, essentialism, materialism and anti-realism
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Ordinary Language
There are the 'is' of predication (a function), the 'is' of identity (equals), and the 'is' of existence (quantifier)
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Against Analysis
Analytical philosophy analyses separate concepts successfully, but lacks a synoptic vision of the results
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
Presumably the statements of science are true, but should they be taken literally or not?
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Set theory attempts to reduce the 'is' of predication to mathematics
The set of Greeks is included in the set of men, but isn't a member of it
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
The standard Z-F Intuition version of set theory has about ten agreed axioms
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Numbers / b. Types of number
Negatives, rationals, irrationals and imaginaries are all postulated to solve baffling equations
Natural numbers are seen in terms of either their ordinality (Peano), or cardinality (set theory)
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. Geometry
Greeks saw the science of proportion as the link between geometry and arithmetic
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
If slowness is a property of walking rather than the walker, we must allow that events exist
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
Early pre-Socratics had a mass-noun ontology, which was replaced by count-nouns
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
If there is no causal interaction with transcendent Platonic objects, how can you learn about them?
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
Why should packed-together particles be a thing (Mt Everest), but not scattered ones?
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Could a horse lose the essential property of being a horse, and yet continue to exist?
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
If a soldier continues to exist after serving as a soldier, does the wind cease to exist after it ceases to blow?
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
One can step into the same river twice, but not into the same water
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
Maybe self-identity isn't existence, if Pegasus can be self-identical but non-existent
Absolutists might accept that to exist is relative, but relative to what? How about relative to itself?
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
The clearest a priori knowledge is proving non-existence through contradiction
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
If we know truths about prime numbers, we seem to have synthetic a priori knowledge of Platonic objects
Assertions about existence beyond experience can only be a priori synthetic
Logical positivism amounts to no more than 'there is no synthetic a priori'
Appeals to intuition seem to imply synthetic a priori knowledge
26. Natural Theory / B. Concepts of Nature / 3. Space / b. Points in space
Rationalists see points as fundamental, but empiricists prefer regions
28. God / C. Proofs of Reason / 1. Ontological Proof
In the ontological argument a full understanding of the concept of God implies a contradiction in 'There is no God'