Ideas from 'The Structure of Objects' by Kathrin Koslicki [2008], by Theme Structure

[found in 'The Structure of Objects' by Koslicki,Kathrin [OUP 2008,978-0-19-959251-7]].

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4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
The 'aggregative' objections says mereology gets existence and location of objects wrong
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Consequence is truth-preserving, either despite substitutions, or in all interpretations
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
'Roses are red; therefore, roses are colored' seems truth-preserving, but not valid in a system
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
Some questions concern mathematical entities, rather than whole structures
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 3. Structural Relations
Structures have positions, constituent types and number, and some invariable parts
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
'Categorical' properties exist in the actual world, and 'hypothetical' properties in other worlds
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
I aim to put the notion of structure or form back into the concepts of part, whole and object
If a whole is just a structure, a dinner party wouldn't need the guests to turn up
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
The clay is just a part of the statue (its matter); the rest consists of its form or structure
Statue and clay differ in modal and temporal properties, and in constitution
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / c. Form as causal
Structure or form are right at the centre of modern rigorous modes of enquiry
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
There are at least six versions of constitution being identity
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
The parts may be the same type as the whole, like a building made of buildings
For three-dimensionalist parthood must be a three-place relation, including times
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
Wholes in modern mereology are intended to replace sets, so they closely resemble them
Wholes are entities distinct from their parts, and have different properties
Wholes are not just their parts; a whole is an entity distinct from the proper parts
26. Natural Theory / B. Concepts of Nature / 6. Natural Kinds / a. Natural kinds
The Kripke/Putnam approach to natural kind terms seems to give them excessive stability
26. Natural Theory / B. Concepts of Nature / 6. Natural Kinds / c. Knowing kinds
Natural kinds support inductive inferences, from previous samples to the next one
26. Natural Theory / B. Concepts of Nature / 6. Natural Kinds / d. Source of kinds
Concepts for species are either intrinsic structure, or relations like breeding or ancestry
26. Natural Theory / B. Concepts of Nature / 6. Natural Kinds / f. Reference to natural kinds
Should vernacular classifications ever be counted as natural kind terms?
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 12. Against Laws of Nature
There are apparently no scientific laws concerning biological species