Ideas from 'The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars' by Keith Campbell [1981], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Properties' (ed/tr Mellor,D.H. /Oliver,A) [OUP 1997,0-19-875176-1]].

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5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
Relations need terms, so they must be second-order entities based on first-order tropes
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
Events are trope-sequences, in which tropes replace one another
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
Tropes solve the Imperfect Community problem, as they can only resemble in one respect
Trope theory makes space central to reality, as tropes must have a shape and size
Two red cloths are separate instances of redness, because you can dye one of them blue
Red could only recur in a variety of objects if it was many, which makes them particulars
Tropes solve the Companionship Difficulty, since the resemblance is only between abstract particulars
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Nominalism has the problem that without humans nothing would resemble anything else
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Tropes are basic particulars, so concrete particulars are collections of co-located tropes
Bundles must be unique, so the Identity of Indiscernibles is a necessity - which it isn't!
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
Two pure spheres in non-absolute space are identical but indiscernible
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 6. Abstract Concepts / c. Abstracta by ignoring
Abstractions come before the mind by concentrating on a part of what is presented
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Causal conditions are particular abstract instances of properties, which makes them tropes
Davidson can't explain causation entirely by events, because conditions are also involved