Ideas from 'The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars' by Keith Campbell [1981], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Properties' (ed/tr Mellor,D.H. /Oliver,A) [OUP 1997,0-19-875176-1]].

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5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
Relations need terms, so they must be second-order entities based on first-order tropes
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
Events are trope-sequences, in which tropes replace one another
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
Two red cloths are separate instances of redness, because you can dye one of them blue
Red could only recur in a variety of objects if it was many, which makes them particulars
Tropes solve the Companionship Difficulty, since the resemblance is only between abstract particulars
Tropes solve the Imperfect Community problem, as they can only resemble in one respect
Trope theory makes space central to reality, as tropes must have a shape and size
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Nominalism has the problem that without humans nothing would resemble anything else
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Tropes are basic particulars, so concrete particulars are collections of co-located tropes
Bundles must be unique, so the Identity of Indiscernibles is a necessity - which it isn't!
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
Two pure spheres in non-absolute space are identical but indiscernible
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
Abstractions come before the mind by concentrating on a part of what is presented
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Causal conditions are particular abstract instances of properties, which makes them tropes
Davidson can't explain causation entirely by events, because conditions are also involved