Ideas from 'Reference and Definite Descriptions' by Keith Donnellan [1966], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds' (ed/tr Schwartz,Stephen P.) [Cornell 1979,0-8014-9861-9]].

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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
Russell only uses descriptions attributively, and Strawson only referentially
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
A definite description can have a non-referential use
Definite descriptions are 'attributive' if they say something about x, and 'referential' if they pick x out
'The x is F' only presumes that x exists; it does not actually entail the existence
19. Language / D. Theories of Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
A definite description 'the F' is referential if the speaker could thereby be referring to something not-F
Donnellan is unclear whether the referential-attributive distinction is semantic or pragmatic
A description can successfully refer, even if its application to the subject is not believed
19. Language / D. Theories of Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
Whether a definite description is referential or attributive depends on the speaker's intention