Ideas from 'What Does It Take to Refer?' by Kent Bach [2006], by Theme Structure

[found in 'The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language' (ed/tr Lepore,E/Smith,B) [OUP 2008,978-0-19-955223-8]].

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4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
Free logic at least allows empty names, but struggles to express non-existence
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
In first-order we can't just assert existence, and it is very hard to deny something's existence
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 3. Constants in Logic
In logic constants play the role of proper names
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Proper names can be non-referential - even predicate as well as attributive uses
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
Millian names struggle with existence, empty names, identities and attitude ascription
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
An object can be described without being referred to
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
Definite descriptions can be used to refer, but are not semantically referential
19. Language / C. Reference / 1. Reference theories
We can refer to fictional entities if they are abstract objects
You 'allude to', not 'refer to', an individual if you keep their identity vague
Fictional reference is different inside and outside the fiction
19. Language / C. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
It can't be real reference if it could refer to some other thing that satisfies the description
Since most expressions can be used non-referentially, none of them are inherently referential
Just alluding to or describing an object is not the same as referring to it
What refers: indefinite or definite or demonstrative descriptions, names, indexicals, demonstratives?
If we can refer to things which change, we can't be obliged to single out their properties
We can think of an individual without have a uniquely characterizing description
19. Language / C. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
Context does not create reference; it is just something speakers can exploit
'That duck' may not refer to the most obvious one in the group
What a pronoun like 'he' refers back to is usually a matter of speaker's intentions
Information comes from knowing who is speaking, not just from interpretation of the utterance
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
People slide from contextual variability all the way to contextual determination