Ideas from 'Guide to Ground' by Kit Fine [2012], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Metaphysical Grounding' (ed/tr Correia,F/Schnieder,B) [CUP 2012,978-1-107-02289-8]].

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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics beyond Science
Realist metaphysics concerns what is real; naive metaphysics concerns natures of things
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
Truths need not always have their source in what exists
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
If the truth-making relation is modal, then modal truths will be grounded in anything
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Logical consequence is verification by a possible world within a truth-set
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
2+2=4 is necessary if it is snowing, but not true in virtue of the fact that it is snowing
If you say one thing causes another, that leaves open that the 'other' has its own distinct reality
An immediate ground is the next lower level, which gives the concept of a hierarchy
'Strict' ground moves down the explanations, but 'weak' ground can move sideways
We learn grounding from what is grounded, not what does the grounding
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
If grounding is a relation it must be between entities of the same type, preferably between facts
Ground is best understood as a sentence operator, rather than a relation between predicates
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
Only metaphysical grounding must be explained by essence
Philosophical explanation is largely by ground (just as cause is used in science)
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / d. Grounding and reduction
We can only explain how a reduction is possible if we accept the concept of ground
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Facts / a. Facts
Facts, such as redness and roundness of a ball, can be 'fused' into one fact
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
Even a three-dimensionalist might identify temporal parts, in their thinking
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
Each basic modality has its 'own' explanatory relation
Every necessary truth is grounded in the nature of something
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Is there metaphysical explanation (as well as causal), involving a constitutive form of determination?
We explain by identity (what it is), or by truth (how things are)
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
If mind supervenes on the physical, it may also explain the physical (and not vice versa)