Ideas from 'Vagueness, Truth and Logic' by Kit Fine [1975], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Vagueness: a Reader' (ed/tr Keefe,R /Smith,P) [MIT 1999,0-262-61145-7]].

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1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Analysis
Study vagueness first by its logic, then by its truth-conditions, and then its metaphysics
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Excluded Middle, and classical logic, may fail for vague predicates
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Logic holding between indefinite sentences is the core of all language
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as semantic
Vagueness is semantic, a deficiency of meaning
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. Vagueness / e. Supervaluation for vagueness
A vague sentence is only true for all ways of making it completely precise
Borderline cases must be under our control, as capable of greater precision
Logical connectives cease to be truth-functional if vagueness is treated with three values
Meaning is both actual (determining instances) and potential (possibility of greater precision)
With the super-truth approach, the classical connectives continue to work
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
Vagueness can be in predicates, names or quantifiers
A thing might be vaguely vague, giving us higher-order vagueness