Ideas from 'Vagueness, Truth and Logic' by Kit Fine [1975], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Vagueness: a Reader' (ed/tr Keefe,R /Smith,P) [MIT 1999,0-262-61145-7]].

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1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Analysis
Study vagueness first by its logic, then by its truth-conditions, and then its metaphysics
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Excluded Middle, and classical logic, may fail for vague predicates
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Logic holding between indefinite sentences is the core of all language
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as semantic
Vagueness is semantic, a deficiency of meaning
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. Vagueness / e. Supervaluation for vagueness
A vague sentence is only true for all ways of making it completely precise
Logical connectives cease to be truth-functional if vagueness is treated with three values
Meaning is both actual (determining instances) and potential (possibility of greater precision)
With the super-truth approach, the classical connectives continue to work
Borderline cases must be under our control, as capable of greater precision
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
Vagueness can be in predicates, names or quantifiers
A thing might be vaguely vague, giving us higher-order vagueness