Ideas from 'Intro to 'Modality and Tense'' by Kit Fine [2005], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Modality and Tense' by Fine,Kit [OUP 2005,0-19-927871-7]].

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1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Despair over Philosophy
Philosophers with a new concept are like children with a new toy
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / f. Names eliminated
Quine's arguments fail because he naively conflates names with descriptions
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
Possible objects are abstract; actual concrete objects are possible; so abstract/concrete are compatible
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Reality
A non-standard realism, with no privileged standpoint, might challenge its absoluteness or coherence
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
Objects, as well as sentences, can have logical form
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
We must distinguish between the identity or essence of an object, and its necessary features
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
The three basic types of necessity are metaphysical, natural and normative
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Metaphysical necessity may be 'whatever the circumstance', or 'regardless of circumstances'
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Empiricists suspect modal notions: either it happens or it doesn't; it is just regularities.
19. Language / C. Semantics / 5. Possible Worlds Semantics
If sentence content is all worlds where it is true, all necessary truths have the same content!