Ideas from 'Necessity and Non-Existence' by Kit Fine [2005], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Modality and Tense' by Fine,Kit [OUP 2005,0-19-927871-7]].

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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
Some sentences depend for their truth on worldly circumstances, and others do not
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
There are levels of existence, as well as reality; objects exist at the lowest level in which they can function
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Reality
Bottom level facts are subject to time and world, middle to world but not time, and top to neither
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Facts / b. Types of fact
Tensed and tenseless sentences state two sorts of fact, which belong to two different 'realms' of reality
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
Modal features are not part of entities, because they are accounted for by the entity
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
What it is is fixed prior to existence or the object's worldly features
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Essential features of an object have no relation to how things actually are
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
Self-identity should have two components, its existence, and its neutral identity with itself
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
We would understand identity between objects, even if their existence was impossible
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 8. Transcendental Necessity
Proper necessary truths hold whatever the circumstances; transcendent truths regardless of circumstances
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
It is the nature of Socrates to be a man, so necessarily he is a man
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
The actual world is a totality of facts, so we also think of possible worlds as totalities
Possible worlds may be more limited, to how things might actually turn out
26. Natural Theory / B. Concepts of Nature / 4. Time / b. Tensed (A) time
A-theorists tend to reject the tensed/tenseless distinction
It is said that in the A-theory, all existents and objects must be tensed, as well as the sentences
26. Natural Theory / B. Concepts of Nature / 4. Time / c. Tenseless (B) time
B-theorists say tensed sentences have an unfilled argument-place for a time