Ideas from 'Semantic Relationism' by Kit Fine [2007], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Semantic Relationism' by Fine,Kit [OUP 2007,978-1-4051-0843-0]].

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5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
Variables can be viewed as special terms - functions taking assignments into individuals
The usual Tarskian interpretation of variables is to specify their range of values
In separate expressions variables seem identical in role, but in the same expression they aren't
The 'algebraic' account of variables reduces quantification to the algebra of its component parts
'Instantial' accounts of variables say we grasp arbitrary instances from their use in quantification
It seemed that Frege gave the syntax for variables, and Tarski the semantics, and that was that
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Cicero/Cicero and Cicero/Tully may differ in relationship, despite being semantically the same
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
If Cicero=Tully refers to the man twice, then surely Cicero=Cicero does as well?
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
You cannot determine the full content from a thought's intrinsic character, as relations are involved
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
Mental files are devices for keeping track of basic coordination of objects
19. Language / C. Semantics / 1. Semantics
That two utterances say the same thing may not be intrinsic to them, but involve their relationships
The two main theories are Holism (which is inferential), and Representational (which is atomistic)
The standard aim of semantics is to assign a semantic value to each expression
We should pursue semantic facts as stated by truths in theories (and not put the theories first!)
Referentialist semantics has objects for names, properties for predicates, and propositions for connectives
Fregeans approach the world through sense, Referentialists through reference
19. Language / C. Semantics / 6. Indexical Semantics
I take indexicals such as 'this' and 'that' to be linked to some associated demonstration
19. Language / D. Theories of Reference / 1. Reference theories
I can only represent individuals as the same if I do not already represent them as the same
19. Language / D. Theories of Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
Frege's Puzzle: from different semantics we infer different reference for two names with the same reference