Ideas from 'Semantic Relationism' by Kit Fine [2007], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Semantic Relationism' by Fine,Kit [OUP 2007,978-1-4051-0843-0]].

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5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
 15593 Variables can be viewed as special terms - functions taking assignments into individuals
 15591 In separate expressions variables seem identical in role, but in the same expression they aren't
 15595 The 'algebraic' account of variables reduces quantification to the algebra of its component parts
 15594 'Instantial' accounts of variables say we grasp arbitrary instances from their use in quantification
 15592 The usual Tarskian interpretation of variables is to specify their range of values
 15590 It seemed that Frege gave the syntax for variables, and Tarski the semantics, and that was that
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
 15599 Cicero/Cicero and Cicero/Tully may differ in relationship, despite being semantically the same
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
 15603 I can only represent individuals as the same if I do not already represent them as the same
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
 15604 If Cicero=Tully refers to the man twice, then surely Cicero=Cicero does as well?
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
 15588 You cannot determine the full content from a thought's intrinsic character, as relations are involved
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
 15602 Mental files are devices for keeping track of basic coordination of objects
19. Language / B. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
 15587 That two utterances say the same thing may not be intrinsic to them, but involve their relationships
 15589 The two main theories are Holism (which is inferential), and Representational (which is atomistic)
 15596 The standard aim of semantics is to assign a semantic value to each expression
 15598 We should pursue semantic facts as stated by truths in theories (and not put the theories first!)
 15600 Referentialist semantics has objects for names, properties for predicates, and propositions for connectives
 15601 Fregeans approach the world through sense, Referentialists through reference
19. Language / B. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
 15605 I take indexicals such as 'this' and 'that' to be linked to some associated demonstration
19. Language / C. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
 15597 Frege's Puzzle: from different semantics we infer different reference for two names with the same reference