Ideas from 'In Defense of Essentialism' by L.A. Paul [2006], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Metaphysics (Philosophical Perspectives 20)' (ed/tr Hawthorne,John) [Blackwell 2006,978-1-4051-6792-5]].

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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal
If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort
Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities
Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds