Ideas from 'Two-Dimensional Semantics' by Laura Schroeter [2010], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy' (ed/tr Stanford University) [plato.stanford.edu ,-]].

Click on the Idea Number for the full details    |     back to texts     |     expand these ideas


10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Superficial necessity is true in all worlds; deep necessity is thus true, no matter which world is actual
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
Contradictory claims about a necessary god both seem apriori coherent
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
2D semantics gives us apriori knowledge of our own meanings
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
Your view of water depends on whether you start from the actual Earth or its counterfactual Twin
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
Rationalists say knowing an expression is identifying its extension using an internal cognitive state
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Internalist meaning is about understanding; externalist meaning is about embedding in a situation
19. Language / B. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
Semantic theory assigns meanings to expressions, and metasemantics explains how this works
19. Language / B. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
Semantic theories show how truth of sentences depends on rules for interpreting and joining their parts
19. Language / B. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
'Federer' and 'best tennis player' can't mean the same, despite having the same extension
Simple semantics assigns extensions to names and to predicates
19. Language / B. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
Possible worlds semantics uses 'intensions' - functions which assign extensions at each world
Possible worlds make 'I' and that person's name synonymous, but they have different meanings
Possible worlds semantics implies a constitutive connection between meanings and modal claims
In the possible worlds account all necessary truths are same (because they all map to the True)
19. Language / B. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
2D fans defend it for conceptual analysis, for meaning, and for internalist reference
Array worlds along the horizontal, and contexts (world,person,time) along the vertical
If we introduce 'actually' into modal talk, we need possible worlds twice to express this
Do we know apriori how we refer to names and natural kinds, but their modal profiles only a posteriori?
2D semantics can't respond to contingent apriori claims, since there is no single proposition involved