Ideas from 'Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus' by Ludwig Wittgenstein [1921], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus' by Wittgenstein,Ludwig (ed/tr Pears,D. /McGuinness,B.) [RKP 1961,0710079230]].
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1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
2937

What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
6870

I say (contrary to Wittgenstein) that philosophy expresses what we thought we must be silent about [Ansell Pearson]

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
2944

If a question can be framed at all, it is also possible to answer it

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
9810

The 'Tractatus' is a masterpiece of antiphilosophy [Badiou]

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
6429

All complex statements can be resolved into constituents and descriptions

2938

The limits of my language means the limits of my world

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
2939

If a sign is useless it is meaningless; that is the point of Ockham's maxim

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
10910

The best account of truthmaking is isomorphism [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
18349

All truths have truthmakers, but only atomic truths correspond to them [Rami]

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
10967

Wittgenstein's picture theory is the best version of the correspondence theory of truth [Read]

7087

Language is [propositionselementary propositionsnames]; reality is [factsstates of affairsobjects] [Grayling]

4702

The account of truth in the 'Tractatus' seems a perfect example of the correspondence theory [O'Grady]

7056

Pictures reach out to or feel reality, touching at the edges, correlating in its parts

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
6428

Wittgenstein is right that logic is just tautologies [Russell]

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
11062

Logic is a priori because it is impossible to think illogically

5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 3. Deductive Consequence 
18277

If q implies p, that is justified by q and p, not by some 'laws' of inference

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
18162

The propositions of logic are analytic tautologies

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 2. Platonism in Logic
7537

Wittgenstein convinced Russell that logic is tautologies, not Platonic forms [Monk]

5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
13429

The identity sign is not essential in logical notation, if every sign has a different meaning [Ramsey]

18154

The sign of identity is not allowed in 'Tractatus' [Bostock]

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
18268

Apparent logical form may not be real logical form

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
10905

My fundamental idea is that the 'logical constants' do not represent

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
7784

'Object' is a pseudoconcept, properly indicated in logic by the variable x

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
7089

A name is primitive, and its meaning is the object

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
9467

Wittgenstein tried unsuccessfully to reduce quantifiers to conjunctions and disjunctions [Jacquette]

5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 1. Proof Systems
15089

Logical proof just explicates complicated tautologies

5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
13830

Logical truths are just 'byproducts' of the introduction rules for logical constants [Hacking]

5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
19292

Logic doesn't split into primitive and derived propositions; they all have the same status

6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / a. Defining numbers
18153

A number is a repeated operation

18160

The concept of number is just what all numbers have in common

6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
18161

The theory of classes is superfluous in mathematics

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
6849

Wittgenstein hated logicism, and described it as a cancerous growth [Monk]

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
13133

The world is facts, not things. Facts determine the world, and the world divides into facts

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
21683

Nothing can be inferred from an elementary proposition

7090

The 'Tractatus' is an extreme example of 'Logical Atomism' [Grayling]

21682

If a proposition is elementary, no other elementary proposition contradicts it

8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
7969

The order of numbers is an internal relation, not an external one

7968

A relation is internal if it is unthinkable that its object should not possess it

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
6056

Identity is not a relation between objects

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. SelfIdentity
6057

Two things can't be identical, and selfidentity is an empty concept

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
9442

The only necessity is logical necessity

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
11027

To know an object you must know all its possible occurrences

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
12869

Two objects may only differ in being different

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. SelfEvidence
16907

If the truth doesn't follow from selfevidence, then selfevidence cannot justify a truth

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
7088

Logic and maths can't say anything about the world, since, as tautologies, they are consistent with all realities [Grayling]

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
16909

Logic is a priori because we cannot think illogically

13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
6591

Doubts can't exist if they are inexpressible or unanswerable

14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
17665

The 'Tractatus' is instrumentalist about laws of nature [Armstrong]

14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
2941

Induction accepts the simplest law that fits our experiences

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
17673

The modern worldview is based on the illusion that laws explain nature

16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
2940

The subject stands outside our understanding of the world

18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / a. Concepts and language
7084

What can be said is what can be thought, so language shows the limits of thought [Grayling]

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as TruthConditions
8172

To understand a proposition means to know what is the case if it is true

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
7086

Good philosophy asserts science, and demonstrates the meaninglessness of metaphysics

22. Metaethics / A. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
2942

The sense of the world must lie outside the world

22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
2943

Ethics cannot be put into words
