Ideas from ''Ostrich Nominalism' or 'Mirage Realism'?' by Michael Devitt [1980], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Properties' (ed/tr Mellor,D.H. /Oliver,A) [OUP 1997,0-19-875176-1]].

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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Realism doesn't explain 'a is F' any further by saying it is 'a has F-ness'
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
The particular/universal distinction is unhelpful clutter; we should accept 'a is F' as basic
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
Quineans take predication about objects as basic, not reference to properties they may have