Ideas from 'Thought and Reality' by Michael Dummett [1997], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Thought and Reality (Gifford Lectures)' by Dummett,Michael [OUP 2006,0-19-920727-5]].

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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
Truth is part of semantics, since valid inference preserves truth
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
Language can violate bivalence because of non-referring terms or ill-defined predicates
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
The law of excluded middle is the logical reflection of the principle of bivalence
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Realism
Philosophers should not presume reality, but only invoke it when language requires it
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Anti-realism
We can't make sense of a world not apprehended by a mind
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Facts / b. Types of fact
Since 'no bird here' and 'no squirrel here' seem the same, we must talk of 'atomic' facts
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Facts / c. Facts and truths
We know we can state facts, with true statements
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as semantic
'That is red or orange' might be considered true, even though 'that is red' and 'that is orange' were not
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Empirical and a priori knowledge are not distinct, but are extremes of a sliding scale
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
The theories of meaning and understanding are the only routes to an account of thought
A theory of thought will include propositional attitudes as well as propositions
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 6. Abstract Concepts / h. Abstractionism critique
To 'abstract from' is a logical process, as opposed to the old mental view
19. Language / B. Meaning / 3. Meaning as Verification
A justificationist theory of meaning leads to the rejection of classical logic
Verificationism could be realist, if we imagined the verification by a superhuman power
If truths about the past depend on memories and current evidence, the past will change
19. Language / B. Meaning / 4. Meaning as Use
We could only guess the meanings of 'true' and 'false' when sentences were used
19. Language / B. Meaning / 6. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
To know the truth-conditions of a sentence, you must already know the meaning
19. Language / B. Meaning / 8. Meaning through Sentences
Sentences are the primary semantic units, because they can say something
19. Language / E. Propositions / 1. Propositions
We can't distinguish a proposition from its content
26. Natural Theory / B. Concepts of Nature / 4. Time / f. Presentism
If Presentism is correct, we cannot even say that the present changes
26. Natural Theory / B. Concepts of Nature / 4. Time / i. Time and change
Time is the measure of change, so we can't speak of time before all change