Ideas from 'Possibility' by Michael Jubien [2009], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Possibility' by Jubien,Michael [OUP 2009,978-0-19-923278-9]].

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1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 2. Conceptual Analysis
If an analysis shows the features of a concept, it doesn't seem to 'reduce' the concept
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
It is a mistake to think that the logic developed for mathematics can clarify language and philosophy
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
The baptiser picks the bearer of a name, but social use decides the category
We only grasp a name if we know whether to apply it when the bearer changes
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
Examples show that ordinary proper names are not rigid designators
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
We could make a contingent description into a rigid and necessary one by adding 'actual' to it
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
Philosophers reduce complex English kind-quantifiers to the simplistic first-order quantifier
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
To exist necessarily is to have an essence whose own essence must be instantiated
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
If objects are just conventional, there is no ontological distinction between stuff and things
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
The category of Venus is not 'object', or even 'planet', but a particular class of good-sized object
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Individuation / a. Individuation
The idea that every entity must have identity conditions is an unfortunate misunderstanding
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
Any entity has the unique property of being that specific entity
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
It is incoherent to think that a given entity depends on its kind for its existence
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
Objects need conventions for their matter, their temporal possibility, and their spatial possibility
Basically, the world doesn't have ready-made 'objects'; we carve objects any way we like
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
If the statue is loved and the clay hated, that is about the object first qua statue, then qua clay
If one entity is an object, a statue, and some clay, these come apart in at least three ways
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
The idea of coincident objects is a last resort, as it is opposed to commonsense naturalism
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
Parts seem to matter when it is just an object, but not matter when it is a kind of object
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
We should not regard essentialism as just nontrivial de re necessity
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
Thinking of them as 'ships' the repaired ship is the original, but as 'objects' the reassembly is the original
Rearranging the planks as a ship is confusing; we'd say it was the same 'object' with a different arrangement
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
If two objects are indiscernible across spacetime, how could we decide whether or not they are the same?
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Entailment does not result from mutual necessity; mutual necessity ensures entailment
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
Modality concerns relations among platonic properties
To analyse modality, we must give accounts of objects, properties and relations
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
The love of possible worlds is part of the dream that technical logic solves philosophical problems
Possible worlds don't explain necessity, because they are a bunch of parallel contingencies
17. Mind and Body / E. Physicalism / 6. Conceptual Dualism
Analysing mental concepts points to 'inclusionism' - that mental phenomena are part of the physical
19. Language / D. Theories of Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
First-order logic tilts in favour of the direct reference theory, in its use of constants for objects