Ideas from 'Causation and Supervenience' by Michael Tooley [2003], by Theme Structure

[found in 'The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics' (ed/tr Loux,M /Zimmerman,D) [OUP 2005,0-19-928422-9]].

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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation / b. Types of cause
Causation distinctions: reductionism/realism; Humean/non-Humean states; observable/non-observable
Causation is either direct realism, Humean reduction, non-Humean reduction or theoretical realism
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation / e. Direction of causation
We can only reduce the direction of causation to the direction of time if we are realist about the latter
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
Causation is directly observable in pressure on one's body, and in willed action
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation
Probabilist laws are compatible with effects always or never happening
The actual cause may not be the most efficacious one
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 3. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
In counterfactual worlds there are laws with no instances, so laws aren't supervenient on actuality
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 3. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Causation is a concept of a relation the same in all worlds, so it can't be a physical process
Explaining causation in terms of laws can't explain the direction of causation