Ideas from 'A Defense of Presentism' by Ned Markosian [2004], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Persistence: contemporary readings' (ed/tr Haslanger,S/|Kurtz,RM) [MIT 2006,978-0-58268-1]].

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1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
People who use science to make philosophical points don't realise how philosophical science is
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
Presentism has the problem that if Socrates ceases to exist, so do propositions about him
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Possible worlds must be abstract, because two qualitatively identical worlds are just one world
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
'Grabby' truth conditions first select their object, unlike 'searchy' truth conditions
26. Natural Theory / B. Concepts of Nature / 4. Time / f. Presentism
Presentism is the view that only present objects exist
Presentism says if objects don't exist now, we can't have attitudes to them or relations with them
Presentism seems to entail that we cannot talk about other times
Serious Presentism says things must exist to have relations and properties; Unrestricted version denies this
Maybe Presentists can refer to the haecceity of a thing, after the thing itself disappears
Maybe Presentists can paraphrase singular propositions about the past
Objects in the past, like Socrates, are more like imaginary objects than like remote spatial objects
People are mistaken when they think 'Socrates was a philosopher' says something
Special Relativity denies the absolute present which Presentism needs