Ideas from 'Mental Acts: their content and their objects' by Peter Geach [1957], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Mental Acts: Their content and their objects' by Geach,Peter [RKP 1971,0-7100-7058-6]].

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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Attributes are functions, not objects; this distinguishes 'square of 2' from 'double of 2'
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
Being 'the same' is meaningless, unless we specify 'the same X'
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
A big flea is a small animal, so 'big' and 'small' cannot be acquired by abstraction
We cannot learn relations by abstraction, because their converse must be learned too
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
You can't define real mental states in terms of behaviour that never happens
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Beliefs aren't tied to particular behaviours
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
The mind does not lift concepts from experience; it creates them, and then applies them
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / c. Concepts without language
If someone has aphasia but can still play chess, they clearly have concepts
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
'Abstractionism' is acquiring a concept by picking out one experience amongst a group
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
'Or' and 'not' are not to be found in the sensible world, or even in the world of inner experience
We can't acquire number-concepts by extracting the number from the things being counted
Abstractionists can't explain counting, because it must precede experience of objects
The numbers don't exist in nature, so they cannot have been abstracted from there into our languages
Blind people can use colour words like 'red' perfectly intelligently
If 'black' and 'cat' can be used in the absence of such objects, how can such usage be abstracted?
We can form two different abstract concepts that apply to a single unified experience