Ideas from 'Philebus' by Plato [353 BCE], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Complete Works' by Plato (ed/tr Cooper,John M.) [Hackett 1997,0-87220-349-2]].

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4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
It seems absurd that seeing a person's limbs, the one is many, and yet the many are one
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Numbers / q. Arithmetic
Daily arithmetic counts unequal things, but pure arithmetic equalises them
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. Geometry
It is absurd to define a circle, but not be able to recognise a real one
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / b. Mixtures
Any mixture which lacks measure and proportion doesn't even count as a mixture at all
If a mixture does not contain measure and proportion, it is corrupted and destroyed
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
If the good is one, is it unchanged when it is in particulars, and is it then separated from itself?
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
A thing can become one or many, depending on how we talk about it
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
If one object is divided into its parts, someone can then say that one are many and many is one
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
How can you be certain about aspects of the world if they aren't constant?
21. Aesthetics / B. Aesthetic Experience / 1. Beauty
If goodness involves moderation and proportion, then it seems to be found in beauty
22. Metaethics / A. Ethical Ends / 2. Goodness / b. Candidates for the Good
Good first, then beauty, then reason, then knowledge, then pleasure
22. Metaethics / A. Ethical Ends / 2. Goodness / c. Form of the Good
The good involves beauty, proportion and truth
Neither intellect nor pleasure are the good, because they are not perfect and self-sufficient
22. Metaethics / A. Ethical Ends / 6. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
Some of the pleasures and pains we feel are false
22. Metaethics / A. Ethical Ends / 6. Pleasure / b. Value of pleasure
Pleasure is certainly very pleasant, but it doesn't follow that all pleasures are good
It is unlikely that the gods feel either pleasure or pain
Would you prefer a life of pleasure without reason, or one of reason without pleasure?
Reason, memory, truth and wisdom are far better than pleasure, for those who can attain them
The good must be sufficient and perfect, and neither intellect nor pleasure are that
22. Metaethics / A. Ethical Ends / 6. Pleasure / c. Types of pleasure
A small pure pleasure is much finer than a large one contaminated with pain
22. Metaethics / A. Ethical Ends / 6. Pleasure / d. Sources of pleasure
We feel pleasure when we approach our natural state of harmony
22. Metaethics / A. Ethical Ends / 6. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
Intense pleasure and pain are not felt in a good body, but in a worthless one
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 2. Hedonism
If you lived a life of maximum pleasure, would you still be lacking anything?
A life of pure pleasure with no intellect is the life of a jellyfish
Hedonists must say that someone in pain is bad, even if they are virtuous