Ideas from 'Philebus' by Plato [353 BCE], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Complete Works' by Plato (ed/tr Cooper,John M.) [Hackett 1997,0-87220-349-2]].
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4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
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15845
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It seems absurd that seeing a person's limbs, the one is many, and yet the many are one
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6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
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9867
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It is absurd to define a circle, but not be able to recognise a real one
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6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / f. Arithmetic
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9865
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Daily arithmetic counts unequal things, but pure arithmetic equalises them
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / b. Mixtures
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15857
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Any mixture which lacks measure and proportion doesn't even count as a mixture at all
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14503
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If a mixture does not contain measure and proportion, it is corrupted and destroyed
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
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4447
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If the good is one, is it unchanged when it is in particulars, and is it then separated from itself?
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
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15856
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A thing can become one or many, depending on how we talk about it
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
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374
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If one object is divided into its parts, someone can then say that one are many and many is one
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11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
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389
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How can you be certain about aspects of the world if they aren't constant?
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21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
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390
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If goodness involves moderation and proportion, then it seems to be found in beauty
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
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391
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The good involves beauty, proportion and truth
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392
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Neither intellect nor pleasure are the good, because they are not perfect and self-sufficient
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
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393
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Good first, then beauty, then reason, then knowledge, then pleasure [PG]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
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385
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Some of the pleasures and pains we feel are false
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
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387
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A small pure pleasure is much finer than a large one contaminated with pain
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
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373
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Pleasure is certainly very pleasant, but it doesn't follow that all pleasures are good
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371
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Reason, memory, truth and wisdom are far better than pleasure, for those who can attain them
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382
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It is unlikely that the gods feel either pleasure or pain
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376
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Would you prefer a life of pleasure without reason, or one of reason without pleasure?
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379
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The good must be sufficient and perfect, and neither intellect nor pleasure are that
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / d. Sources of pleasure
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381
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We feel pleasure when we approach our natural state of harmony
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
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386
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Intense pleasure and pain are not felt in a good body, but in a worthless one
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23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 2. Hedonism
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388
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Hedonists must say that someone in pain is bad, even if they are virtuous
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377
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If you lived a life of maximum pleasure, would you still be lacking anything?
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378
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A life of pure pleasure with no intellect is the life of a jellyfish
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