Ideas from 'A Powerful Particulars View of Causation' by R.D. Ingthorsson [2021], by Theme Structure

[found in 'A Powerful Particulars View of Causation' by Ingthorsson,R.D. [Routledge pdf 2021,978-0-8153-6292-0]].

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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
Metaphysics can criticise interpretations of science theories, and give good feedback
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
Philosophers accepted first-order logic, because they took science to be descriptive, not explanatory
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
Basic processes are said to be either physical, or organic, or psychological
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Realism
Indirect realists are cautious about the manifest image, and prefer the scientific image
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
Neo-Humeans say there are no substantial connections between anything
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
Properties are said to be categorical qualities or non-qualitative dispositions
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Physics understands the charge of an electron as a power, not as a quality
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Compound objects are processes, insofar as change is essential to them
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
Most materialist views postulate smallest indivisible components which are permanent
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
Endurance and perdurance just show the consequences of A or B series time
Science suggests causal aspects of the constitution and persistance of objects
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
If causation involves production, that needs persisting objects
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Every philosophical theory must be true in some possible world, so the ontology is hopeless
Worlds may differ in various respects, but no overall similarity of worlds is implied
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Humeans describe the surface of causation, while powers accounts aim at deeper explanations
Time and space are not causal, but they determine natural phenomena
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Casuation is the transmission of conserved quantities between causal processes
Causation as transfer only works for asymmetric interactions
Interventionist causal theory says it gets a reliable result whenever you manipulate it
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Causal events are always reciprocal, and there is no distinction of action and reaction
One effect cannot act on a second effect in causation, because the second doesn't yet exist
Empiricists preferred events to objects as the relata, because they have observable motions
Science now says all actions are reciprocal, not unidirectional
Causes are not agents; the whole interaction is the cause, and the changed compound is the effect
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
People only accept the counterfactual when they know the underlying cause
Counterfactuals don't explain causation, but causation can explain counterfactuals
Counterfactual theories are false in possible worlds where causation is actual
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
A cause can fail to produce its normal effect, by prevention, pre-emption, finks or antidotes
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
Any process can go backwards or forwards in time without violating the basic laws of physics
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / b. Laws of motion
In modern physics the first and second laws of motion (unlike the third) fail at extremes
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
If particles have decay rates, they can't really be elementary, in the sense of indivisible
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Presentism
It is difficult to handle presentism in first-order logic