Ideas from 'Propositions' by Richard Cartwright [1962], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Philosophical Essays' by Cartwright,Richard [MIT 1987,0-262-53092-9]].

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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Logicians take sentences to be truth-bearers for rigour, rather than for philosophical reasons
Are the truth-bearers sentences, utterances, ideas, beliefs, judgements, propositions or statements?
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
All models of Peano axioms are isomorphic, so the models all seem equally good for natural numbers
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
A token isn't a unique occurrence, as the case of a word or a number shows
19. Language / B. Meaning / 1. Meaning
Assertions, unlike sentence meanings, can be accurate, probable, exaggerated, false....
For any statement, there is no one meaning which any sentence asserting it must have
People don't assert the meaning of the words they utter
19. Language / E. Propositions / 2. Nature of Propositions
'It's raining' makes a different assertion on different occasions, but its meaning remains the same
19. Language / E. Propositions / 4. Support for Propositions
We can attribute 'true' and 'false' to whatever it was that was said
We can pull apart assertion from utterance, and the action, the event and the subject-matter for each
To assert that p, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to utter some particular words