Ideas from 'Universal Prescriptivism' by Richard M. Hare [1991], by Theme Structure

[found in 'A Companion to Ethics' (ed/tr Singer,Peter) [Blackwell 1993,0-631-18785-5]].

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22. Metaethics / C. Sources of Ethics / 3. Intuitionism
You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate
How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones?
22. Metaethics / C. Sources of Ethics / 4. Expressivism
Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons
22. Metaethics / C. Sources of Ethics / 5. Prescriptivism
An 'ought' statement implies universal application
Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't
If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved
Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable
Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation
If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle