Ideas from 'Epistemology: contemporary introduction' by Robert Audi [1998], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Epistemology: a contemporary introduction' by Audi,Robert [Routledge 1998,0-415-13043-3]].

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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
Because 'gold is malleable' is necessary does not mean that it is analytic
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 3. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
Beliefs are based on perception, memory, introspection or reason
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 3. Belief / e. Belief holism
Could you have a single belief on its own?
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
We can make certain of what we know, so knowing does not entail certainty
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Sense-data theory is indirect realism, but phenomenalism is direct irrealism
If you gradually remove a book's sensory properties, what is left at the end?
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
Red and green being exclusive colours seems to be rationally graspable but not analytic
The concepts needed for a priori thought may come from experience
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
To see something as a field, I obviously need the concept of a field
How could I see a field and believe nothing regarding it?
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
Sense data imply representative realism, possibly only representing primary qualities
Sense-data (and the rival 'adverbial' theory) are to explain illusions and hallucinations
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Perception is first simple, then objectual (with concepts) and then propositional
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
The principles of justification have to be a priori
Virtually all rationalists assert that we can have knowledge of synthetic a priori truths
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 3. Memory
I might remember someone I can't recall or image, by recognising them on meeting
To remember something is to know it
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
Justification is either unanchored (infinite or circular), or anchored (in knowledge or non-knowledge)
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
Internalism about justification implies that there is a right to believe something
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
Maths may be consistent with observations, but not coherent
It is very hard to show how much coherence is needed for justification
A consistent madman could have a very coherent belief system
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Consistent accurate prediction looks like knowledge without justified belief
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
A reliability theory of knowledge seems to involve truth as correspondence
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
'Reliable' is a very imprecise term, and may even mean 'justified'
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Self-Knowledge
We can be ignorant about ourselves, for example, our desires and motives