Ideas from 'Reference and Necessity' by Robert C. Stalnaker [1997], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Ways a World Might Be' by Stalnaker,Robert C. [OUP 2003,0-19-925149-5]].

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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient?
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways
Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries
Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true