Ideas from 'Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity' by Robert C. Stalnaker [2003], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Ways a World Might Be' by Stalnaker,Robert C. [OUP 2003,0-19-925149-5]].

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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts
Conceptual possibilities are metaphysical possibilities we can conceive of
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
Critics say there are just an a priori necessary part, and an a posteriori contingent part
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
A 'centred' world is an ordered triple of world, individual and time
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Meanings aren't in the head, but that is because they are abstract
19. Language / C. Semantics / 7. Two-Dimensional Semantics
In one view, the secondary intension is metasemantic, about how the thinker relates to the content
Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension
19. Language / D. Theories of Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content