Ideas from 'Mind and Body' by Robert Kirk [2003], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Mind and Body' by Kirk,Robert [Acumen 2003,1-902683-80-0]].

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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
A weaker kind of reductionism than direct translation is the use of 'bridge laws'
15. Nature of Minds / B. Properties of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness
Maybe we should see intentionality and consciousness as a single problem, not two
15. Nature of Minds / B. Properties of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
If a bird captures a worm, we could say its behaviour is 'about' the worm
15. Nature of Minds / B. Properties of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Behaviourism says intentionality is an external relation; language of thought says it's internal
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
Dualism implies some brain events with no physical cause, and others with no physical effect
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 1. Behaviourism
Behaviourism seems a good theory for intentional states, but bad for phenomenal ones
Behaviourism offers a good alternative to simplistic unitary accounts of mental relationships
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Behavioural Dispositions
In 'holistic' behaviourism we say a mental state is a complex of many dispositions
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
The inverted spectrum idea is often regarded as an objection to behaviourism
17. Mind and Body / E. Physicalism / 2. Reduction of Mind
All meaningful psychological statements can be translated into physics
17. Mind and Body / E. Physicalism / 4. Connectionism
Instead of representation by sentences, it can be by a distribution of connectionist strengths
17. Mind and Body / E. Physicalism / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
If mental states are multiply realisable, they could not be translated into physical terms
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
It seems unlikely that most concepts are innate, if a theory must be understood to grasp them
19. Language / A. Language / 1. Language
For behaviourists language is just a special kind of behaviour
19. Language / D. Theories of Reference / 1. Reference theories
Behaviourists doubt whether reference is a single type of relation