Ideas from 'Animal Rights and Wrongs' by Roger Scruton [1996], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Animal Rights and Wrongs' by Scruton,Roger [Demos 1996,1-898309-82-5]].

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11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
Having beliefs involves recognition, expectation and surprise
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / f. Animal beliefs
If an animal has beliefs, that implies not only that it can make mistakes, but that it can learn from them
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Perception (which involves an assessment) is a higher state than sensation
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
There is consciousness whenever behaviour must be explained in terms of mental activity
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 2. Persons as Responsible
Our concept of a person is derived from Roman law
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Conditioning may change behaviour without changing the mind
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions
An emotion is a motive which is also a feeling
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality
Do we use reason to distinguish people from animals, or use that difference to define reason?
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
All moral life depends ultimately on piety, which is our recognition of our own dependence
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
Kant's Moral Law is the rules rational beings would accept when trying to live by agreement
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The modern virtues are courage, prudence, wisdom, temperance, justice, charity and loyalty
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Only just people will drop their own self-interests when faced with an impartial verdict
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
Sympathy can undermine the moral order just as much as crime does
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
That which can only be done by a callous person, ought not to be done
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
As soon as we drop self-interest and judge impartially, we find ourselves agreeing about conflicts
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism merely guides us (by means of sympathy) when the moral law is silent
Morality is not a sort of calculation, it is what sets the limits to when calculation is appropriate
Utilitarianism says we can't blame Stalin yet, but such a theory is a sick joke
Utilitarianism is wrong precisely because it can't distinguish animals from people
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Animals command our sympathy and moral concern initially because of their intentionality
We can easily remove the risk of suffering from an animal's life, but we shouldn't do it
Many breeds of animals have needs which our own ancestors planted in them
Introducing a natural means of controlling animal population may not be very compassionate
Letting your dog kill wild rats, and keeping rats for your dog to kill, are very different
We favour our own animals over foreign ones because we see them as fellow citizens
Brutal animal sports are banned because they harm the personality of the watcher
Many of the stranger forms of life (e.g. worms) interest us only as a species, not as individuals
An animal has individuality if it is nameable, and advanced animals can respond to their name
I may avoid stepping on a spider or flower, but fellow-feeling makes me protect a rabbit
Lucky animals are eaten by large predators, the less lucky starve, and worst is death by small predators
Sheep and cattle live comfortable lives, and die an enviably easy death
Concern for one animal may harm the species, if the individual is part of a bigger problem
Animals are outside the community of rights, but we still have duties towards them