Ideas from 'Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology' by Ross P. Cameron [2008], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Being: Developments in Contemporary Metaphysics' (ed/tr Le Poidevin,Robin) [CUP 2008,978-0-521-73544-5]].

Click on the Idea Number for the full details    |     back to texts     |     expand these ideas


3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
Moral realism doesn't seem to entail the existence of any things
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
Surely if some propositions are grounded in existence, they all are?
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
Orthodox Truthmaker applies to all propositions, and necessitates their truth
God fixes all the truths of the world by fixing what exists
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
What the proposition says may not be its truthmaker
Rather than what exists, some claim that the truthmakers are ways of existence, dispositions, modalities etc
Truthmaking doesn't require realism, because we can be anti-realist about truthmakers
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
Without truthmakers, negative truths must be ungrounded
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
Maybe truthmaking and correspondence stand together, and are interdefinable
I support the correspondence theory because I believe in truthmakers
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Realism
For realists it is analytic that truths are grounded in the world
Realism says a discourse is true or false, and some of it is true
Realism says truths rest on mind-independent reality; truthmaking theories are about which features
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
We should reject distinct but indiscernible worlds