Ideas from 'Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology' by Ross P. Cameron [2008], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Being: Developments in Contemporary Metaphysics' (ed/tr Le Poidevin,Robin) [CUP 2008,978-0-521-73544-5]].

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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
Moral realism doesn't seem to entail the existence of any things
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
Surely if some propositions are grounded in existence, they all are?
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
Orthodox Truthmaker applies to all propositions, and necessitates their truth
God fixes all the truths of the world by fixing what exists
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
Truthmaking doesn't require realism, because we can be anti-realist about truthmakers
What the proposition says may not be its truthmaker
Rather than what exists, some claim that the truthmakers are ways of existence, dispositions, modalities etc
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
Without truthmakers, negative truths must be ungrounded
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
I support the correspondence theory because I believe in truthmakers
Maybe truthmaking and correspondence stand together, and are interdefinable
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Realism
For realists it is analytic that truths are grounded in the world
Realism says a discourse is true or false, and some of it is true
Realism says truths rest on mind-independent reality; truthmaking theories are about which features
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
We should reject distinct but indiscernible worlds