Ideas from 'Truthmaking for Presentists' by Ross P. Cameron [2011], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Vol.6' (ed/tr Zimmerman,D/Bennett,K) [OUP 2011,978-0-19-960304-6]].

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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
The present property 'having been F' says nothing about a thing's intrinsic nature
One temporal distibution property grounds our present and past truths
We don't want present truthmakers for the past, if they are about to cease to exist!
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
Being polka-dotted is a 'spatial distribution' property
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
Change is instantiation of a non-uniform distributional property, like 'being red-then-orange'
26. Natural Theory / B. Concepts of Nature / 4. Time / f. Presentism
Surely if things extend over time, then time itself must be extended?