Ideas from 'Naming and Necessity lectures' by Saul A. Kripke [1970], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Naming and Necessity' by Kripke,Saul [Blackwell 1980,0-631-12801-8]].

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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
Kripke separated semantics from metaphysics, rather than linking them, making the latter independent
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Against Analysis
Analyses of concepts using entirely different terms are very inclined to fail
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
Some definitions aim to fix a reference rather than give a meaning
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
Names are rigid, making them unlike definite descriptions
Names are rigid designators, which designate the same object in all possible worlds
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
A bundle of qualities is a collection of abstractions, so it can't be a particular
A name can still refer even if it satisfies none of its well-known descriptions
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
Some references, such as 'Neptune', have to be fixed by description rather than baptism
Proper names must have referents, because they are not descriptive
A name's reference is not fixed by any marks or properties of the referent
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Realism
Kripke's metaphysics (essences, kinds, rigidity) blocks the slide into sociology
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
Kripke individuates objects by essential modal properties (and presupposes essentialism)
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
Given that a table is made of molecules, could it not be molecular and still be this table?
If we imagine this table made of ice or different wood, we are imagining a different table
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
For Kripke, essence is origin; for Putnam, essence is properties; for Wiggins, essence is membership of a kind
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Atomic number 79 is part of the nature of the gold we know
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
An essential property is true of an object in any case where it would have existed
De re modality is an object having essential properties
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Important properties of an object need not be essential to it
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
Given that Nixon is indeed a human being, that he might not have been does not concern knowledge
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
An essence is the necessary properties, derived from an intuitive identity, in origin, type and material
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
No one seems to know the identity conditions for a material object (or for people) over time
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
If we lose track of origin, how do we show we are maintaining a reference?
Kripke argues, of the Queen, that parents of an organism are essentially so
Could the actual Queen have been born of different parents?
Socrates can't have a necessary origin, because he might have had no 'origin'
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
If Hesperus and Phosophorus are the same, they can't possibly be different
Identity statements can be contingent if they rely on descriptions
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Kripke says his necessary a posteriori examples are known a priori to be necessary
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
Physical necessity may be necessity in the highest degree
Instead of being regularities, maybe natural laws are the weak a posteriori necessities of Kripke
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
A priori = Necessary because we imagine all worlds, and we know without looking at actuality?
Kripke separates necessary and a priori, proposing necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori examples
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 2. A Priori Contingent
The meter is defined necessarily, but the stick being one meter long is contingent a priori
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
"'Hesperus' is 'Phosphorus'" is necessarily true, if it is true, but not known a priori
Theoretical identities are between rigid designators, and so are necessary a posteriori
Kripke has demonstrated that some necessary truths are only knowable a posteriori
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Possible worlds aren't puzzling places to learn about, but places we ourselves describe
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
If we discuss what might have happened to Nixon, we stipulate that it is about Nixon
Transworld identification is unproblematic, because we stipulate that we rigidly refer to something
A table in some possible world should not even be identified by its essential properties
Identification across possible worlds does not need properties, even essential ones
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
Test for rigidity by inserting into the sentence 'N might not have been N'
Kripke avoids difficulties of transworld identity by saying it is a decision, not a discovery
If Kripke names must still denote a thing in a non-actual situation, the statue isn't its clay
A rigid expression may refer at a world to an object not existing in that world
We do not begin with possible worlds and place objects in them; we begin with objects in the real world
It is a necessary truth that Elizabeth II was the child of two particular parents
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
That there might have been unicorns is false; we don't know the circumstances for unicorns
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
Kripke has breathed new life into the a priori/a posteriori distinction
Rather than 'a priori truth', it is best to stick to whether some person knows it on a priori evidence
A priori truths can be known independently of experience - but they don't have to be
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
Analytic judgements are a priori, even when their content is empirical
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Intuition
Intuition is the strongest possible evidence one can have about anything
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Identities like 'heat is molecule motion' are necessary (in the highest degree), not contingent
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
It seems logically possible to have the pain brain state without the actual pain
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Kripke assumes that mind-brain identity designates rigidly, which it doesn't
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / e. Modal argument
Kripke says pain is necessarily pain, but a brain state isn't necessarily painful
Identity must be necessary, but pain isn't necessarily a brain state, so they aren't identical
Identity theorists seem committed to no-brain-event-no-pain, and vice versa, which seems wrong
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
Kripke derives accounts of reference and proper names from assumptions about worlds and essences
Kripke has a definitional account of kinds, but not of naming
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
The important cause is not between dubbing and current use, but between the item and the speaker's information
We may refer through a causal chain, but still change what is referred to
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
We refer through the community, going back to the original referent
Kripke's theory is important because it gives a collective account of reference
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
Frege's 'sense' is ambiguous, between the meaning of a designator, and how it fixes reference
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
Descriptive reference shows how to refer, how to identify two things, and how to challenge existence
It can't be necessary that Aristotle had the properties commonly attributed to him
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
Rigid designation creates a puzzle - why do some necessary truths appear to be contingent?
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Necessity of Kinds
'Cats are animals' has turned out to be a necessary truth
Gold's atomic number might not be 79, but if it is, could non-79 stuff be gold?
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 6. Reference to Natural Kinds
The properties that fix reference are contingent, the properties involving meaning are necessary
Terms for natural kinds are very close to proper names
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 7. Critique of Kinds
Nominal essence may well be neither necessary nor sufficient for a natural kind
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
The scientific discovery (if correct) that gold has atomic number 79 is a necessary truth
Scientific discoveries about gold are necessary truths
Once we've found that heat is molecular motion, then that's what it is, in all possible worlds
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
Science searches basic structures in search of essences
27. Natural Reality / F. Biology / 5. Species
The original concept of 'cat' comes from paradigmatic instances
'Tiger' designates a species, and merely looking like the species is not enough
Tigers may lack all the properties we originally used to identify them