Ideas from 'Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo' by Thomas Aquinas [1271], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Selected Philosophical Writings' by Aquinas,Thomas (ed/tr McDermott,Timothy) [OUP 1993,0-19-282946-7]].

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2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
We are coerced into assent to a truth by reason's violence
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
The mind is compelled by necessary truths, but not by contingent truths
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
For the mind Good is one truth among many, and Truth is one good among many
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Knowledge may be based on senses, but we needn't sense all our knowledge
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will
If we saw something as totally and utterly good, we would be compelled to will it
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
The will is not compelled to move, even if pleasant things are set before it
However habituated you are, given time to ponder you can go against a habit
Since will is a reasoning power, it can entertain opposites, so it is not compelled to embrace one of them
Nothing can be willed except what is good, but good is very varied, and so choices are unpredictable
Because the will moves by examining alternatives, it doesn't compel itself to will
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
We must admit that when the will is not willing something, the first movement to will must come from outside the will
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The will can only want what it thinks is good
We don't have to will even perfect good, because we can choose not to think of it
The will must aim at happiness, but can choose the means
22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Good applies to goals, just as truth applies to ideas in the mind
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Without free will not only is ethical action meaningless, but also planning, commanding, praising and blaming
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
Even a sufficient cause doesn't compel its effect, because interference could interrupt the process