Ideas from 'De Corpore (Elements, First Section)' by Thomas Hobbes [1655], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Metaphysical Writings' by Hobbes,Thomas (ed/tr Calkins,Mary Whiton) [Open Court 1905,0-87548-045-4]].

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1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
Definitions are the first step in philosophy
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
Definitions of things that are caused must express their manner of generation
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
Definition is resolution of names into successive genera, and finally the difference
2. Reason / D. Definition / 8. Impredicative Definition
A defined name should not appear in the definition
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 3. Question Begging
'Petitio principii' is reusing the idea to be defined, in disguised words
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 3. Axioms of Mereology
A part of a part is a part of a whole
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
If we just say one, one, one, one, we don't know where we have got to
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
Change is nothing but movement
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
Accidents are just modes of thinking about bodies
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
Accidents are not parts of bodies (like blood in a cloth); they have accidents as things have a size
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
The complete power of an event is just the aggregate of the qualities that produced it
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
The only generalities or universals are names or signs
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / c. Individuation by location
Bodies are independent of thought, and coincide with part of space
If you separate the two places of one thing, you will also separate the thing
If you separated two things in the same place, you would also separate the places
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
If a whole body is moved, its parts must move with it
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
A body is always the same, whether the parts are together or dispersed
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
To make a whole, parts needn't be put together, but can be united in the mind
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Particulars contain universal things
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
Some accidental features are permanent, unless the object perishes
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
The feature which picks out or names a thing is usually called its 'essence'
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
It is the same river if it has the same source, no matter what flows in it
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
If a new ship were made of the discarded planks, would two ships be numerically the same?
Some individuate the ship by unity of matter, and others by unity of form
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
As an infant, Socrates was not the same body, but he was the same human being
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Two bodies differ when (at some time) you can say something of one you can't say of the other
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
We can imagine a point swelling and contracting - but not how this could be done
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Science aims to show causes and generation of things
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
Imagination is just weakened sensation
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 10. Conatus/Striving
A 'conatus' is an initial motion, experienced by us as desire or aversion [Arthur,R]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Sensation is merely internal motion of the sentient being
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions
Apart from pleasure and pain, the only emotions are appetite and aversion
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
Words are not for communication, but as marks for remembering what we have learned
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / b. Prime matter
Prime matter is body considered with mere size and extension, and potential
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Acting on a body is either creating or destroying a property in it
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
An effect needs a sufficient and necessary cause
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
A cause is the complete sum of the features which necessitate the effect
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
Motion is losing one place and acquiring another
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
'Force' is the quantity of movement imposed on something
27. Natural Reality / C. Space-Time / 2. Time / f. Presentism
Past times can't exist anywhere, apart from in our memories