Ideas from 'The View from Nowhere' by Thomas Nagel [1986], by Theme Structure

[found in 'The View from Nowhere' by Nagel,Thomas [OUP 1989,0-19-505644-2]].

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1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
There is more insight in fundamental perplexity about problems than in their supposed solutions
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Philosophy is the childhood of the intellect, and a culture can't skip it
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 4. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
It seems mad, but the aim of philosophy is to climb outside of our own minds
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Realism invites scepticism because it claims to be objective
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
Modern science depends on the distinction between primary and secondary qualities
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
Epistemology is centrally about what we should believe, not the definition of knowledge
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Scepticism is based on ideas which scepticism makes impossible
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
Observed regularities are only predictable if we assume hidden necessity
16. Persons / B. Concept of the Self / 5. Persistence of Self
The question of whether a future experience will be mine presupposes personal identity
16. Persons / D. Self as Non-Physical / 2. A Priori Self
Personal identity cannot be fully known a priori
16. Persons / E. Self as Mind / 5. Split Consciousness
I can't even conceive of my brain being split in two
22. Metaethics / A. Ethical Ends / 1. Value / b. Objective value
Total objectivity can't see value, but it sees many people with values
22. Metaethics / A. Ethical Ends / 7. Altruism
If our own life lacks meaning, devotion to others won't give it meaning
22. Metaethics / B. Basis of Ethics / 7. Moral Motives
Pain doesn't have a further property of badness; it gives a reason for its avoidance
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
Something may be 'rational' either because it is required or because it is acceptable
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
If cockroaches can't think about their actions, they have no duties
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
If we can decide how to live after stepping outside of ourselves, we have the basis of a moral theory
We should see others' viewpoints, but not lose touch with our own values
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 5. Motivation for Duty
We find new motives by discovering reasons for action different from our preexisting motives
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 3. Motivation for Altruism
Utilitarianism is too demanding
24. Applied Ethics / C. Death Issues / 1. Death
We don't worry about the time before we were born the way we worry about death