Ideas from 'The View from Nowhere' by Thomas Nagel [1986], by Theme Structure

[found in 'The View from Nowhere' by Nagel,Thomas [OUP 1989,0-19-505644-2]].

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1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
There is more insight in fundamental perplexity about problems than in their supposed solutions
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Philosophy is the childhood of the intellect, and a culture can't skip it
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
It seems mad, but the aim of philosophy is to climb outside of our own minds
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Realism invites scepticism because it claims to be objective
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
Modern science depends on the distinction between primary and secondary qualities
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
Epistemology is centrally about what we should believe, not the definition of knowledge
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Scepticism is based on ideas which scepticism makes impossible
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
Observed regularities are only predictable if we assume hidden necessity
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
Personal identity cannot be fully known a priori
The question of whether a future experience will be mine presupposes personal identity
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 4. Split Consciousness
I can't even conceive of my brain being split in two
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
Total objectivity can't see value, but it sees many people with values
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 2. Values / b. Altruism
If our own life lacks meaning, devotion to others won't give it meaning
22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
Pain doesn't have a further property of badness; it gives a reason for its avoidance
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
Something may be 'rational' either because it is required or because it is acceptable
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
If cockroaches can't think about their actions, they have no duties
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
We should see others' viewpoints, but not lose touch with our own values
If we can decide how to live after stepping outside of ourselves, we have the basis of a moral theory
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 5. Motivation for Duty
We find new motives by discovering reasons for action different from our preexisting motives
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 3. Motivation for Altruism
Utilitarianism is too demanding
24. Applied Ethics / C. Death Issues / 1. Death
We don't worry about the time before we were born the way we worry about death