Ideas from 'Elements of Mind' by Tim Crane [2001], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Elements of Mind' by Crane,Tim [OUP 2001,0-19-289297-5]].

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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
The theory of descriptions supports internalism, since they are thinkable when the object is non-existent
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Aesthetic properties of thing supervene on their physical properties
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Constitution (as in a statue constituted by its marble) is supervenience without identity
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
The distinction between 'resultant' properties (weight) and 'emergent' properties is a bit vague
If mental properties are emergent they add a new type of causation, and physics is not complete
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
Properties are causes
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Traditional substance is separate from properties and capable of independent existence
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
Maybe beliefs don't need to be conscious, if you are not conscious of the beliefs guiding your actions
Maybe there are two kinds of belief - 'de re' beliefs and 'de dicto' beliefs
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 6. Knowing How
Many cases of knowing how can be expressed in propositional terms (like how to get somewhere)
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Phenol-thio-urea tastes bitter to three-quarters of people, but to the rest it is tasteless, so which is it?
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
One can taste that the wine is sour, and one can also taste the sourness of the wine
The traditional supports for the sense datum theory were seeing double and specks before one's eyes
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
The problems of perception disappear if it is a relation to an intentional state, not to an object or sense datum
If we smell something we are aware of the smell separately, but we don't perceive a 'look' when we see
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
If perception is much richer than our powers of description, this suggests that it is non-conceptual
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory
The adverbial theory of perceptions says it is the experiences which have properties, not the objects
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Is knowledge just a state of mind, or does it also involve the existence of external things?
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
The core of the consciousness problem is the case of Mary, zombies, and the Hard Question
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Intentionalism does not require that all mental states be propositional attitudes
Object-directed attitudes like love are just as significant as propositional attitudes
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
If someone removes their glasses the content of experience remains, but the quality changes
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
Pains have a region of the body as their intentional content, not some pain object
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
Weak intentionalism says qualia are extra properties; strong intentionalism says they are intentional
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 6. Inverted Qualia
With inverted qualia a person's experiences would change, but their beliefs remain the same
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
Descartes did not think of minds as made of a substance, because they are not divisible
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
Functionalism defines mental states by their causal properties, which rules out epiphenomenalism
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
The problems of misrepresentation and error have dogged physicalist reductions of intentionality
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
Properties dualism says mental properties are distinct from physical, despite a single underlying substance
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
Non-reductive physicalism seeks an explanation of supervenience, but emergentists accept it as basic
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
If mental supervenes on the physical, then every physical cause will be accompanied by a mental one
17. Mind and Body / E. Physicalism / 1. Physicalism
Identity theory is either of particular events, or of properties, depending on your theory of causation
Physicalism may be the source of the mind-body problem, rather than its solution
17. Mind and Body / E. Physicalism / 5. Causal Argument
Overdetermination occurs if two events cause an effect, when each would have caused it alone
17. Mind and Body / E. Physicalism / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
The completeness of physics must be an essential component of any physicalist view of mind
17. Mind and Body / E. Physicalism / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument
Experience teaches us propositions, because we can reason about our phenomenal experience
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
The Twin Earth argument depends on reference being determined by content, which may be false.
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Broad content entails the existence of the object of the thought
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
In intensional contexts, truth depends on how extensions are conceived.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation / b. Types of cause
Causation can be seen in counterfactual terms, or as increased probability, or as energy flow
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Causes are properties, not events, because properties are what make a difference in a situation
28. God / C. Proofs of Reason / 1. Ontological Proof
It seems that 'exists' could sometimes be a predicate