Ideas from 'Objects and Persons' by Trenton Merricks [2003], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Objects and Persons' by Merricks,Trenton [OUP 2003,0-19-926631-x]].

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1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Empirical investigation can't discover if holes exist, or if two things share a colour
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
Prolonged events don't seem to endure or exist at any particular time
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. Vagueness / a. Vagueness of reality
A crumbling statue can't become vague, because vagueness is incoherent
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
Intrinsic properties are those an object still has even if only that object exists
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
I say that most of the objects of folk ontology do not exist
Is swimming pool water an object, composed of its mass or parts?
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
We can eliminate objects without a commitment to simples
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
If atoms 'arranged baseballwise' break a window, that analytically entails that a baseball did it
Overdetermination: the atoms do all the causing, so the baseball causes no breakage
Merricks agrees that there are no composite objects, but offers a different semantics
The 'folk' way of carving up the world is not intrinsically better than quite arbitrary ways
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
Clay does not 'constitute' a statue, as they have different persistence conditions (flaking, squashing)
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
There is no visible difference between statues, and atoms arranged statuewise
'Unrestricted composition' says any two things can make up a third thing
Composition as identity is false, as identity is never between a single thing and many things
Composition as identity is false, as it implies that things never change their parts
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
'Composition' says things are their parts; 'constitution' says a whole substance is an object
It seems wrong that constitution entails that two objects are wholly co-located
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
Objects decompose (it seems) into non-overlapping parts that fill its whole region
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 13. No Identity over Time
Eliminativism about objects gives the best understanding of the Sorites paradox
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
If my counterpart is happy, that is irrelevant to whether I 'could' have been happy
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
The 'warrant' for a belief is what turns a true belief into knowledge
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 1. Existence of Persons
Maybe the word 'I' can only refer to persons
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Animals
You hold a child in your arms, so it is not mental substance, or mental state, or software
16. Persons / E. Self as Mind / 6. Self as Meta-awareness
Human organisms can exercise downward causation
16. Persons / G. Free Will / 1. Free Will / a. Nature of free will
Free will and determinism are incompatible, since determinism destroys human choice
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
Before Creation it is assumed that God still had many many mental properties
The hypothesis of solipsism doesn't seem to be made incoherent by the nature of mental properties