Ideas from 'Truth and Ontology' by Trenton Merricks [2007], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Truth and Ontology' by Merricks,Trenton [OUP 2007,978-0-19-920523-3]].

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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
A ground must be about its truth, and not just necessitate it
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
Truthmaker needs truths to be 'about' something, and that is often unclear
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
If a ball changes from red to white, Truthmaker says some thing must make the change true
Truthmaker says if an entity is removed, some nonexistence truthmaker must replace it
If Truthmaker says each truth is made by the existence of something, the theory had de re modality at is core
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
Truthmaker demands not just a predication, but an existing state of affairs with essential ingredients
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
If 'truth supervenes on being', worlds with the same entities, properties and relations have the same truths
If truth supervenes on being, that won't explain why truth depends on being
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
It is implausible that claims about non-existence are about existing things
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
Truthmaker isn't the correspondence theory, because it offers no analysis of truth
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
Speculations about non-existent things are not about existent things, so Truthmaker is false
I am a truthmaker for 'that a human exists', but is it about me?
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
Being true is not a relation, it is a primitive monadic property
If the correspondence theory is right, then necessary truths must correspond to something
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Deflationism just says there is no property of being truth
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
The totality state is the most plausible truthmaker for negative existential truths
Fregeans say 'hobbits do not exist' is just 'being a hobbit' is not exemplified
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
Some properties seem to be primitive, but others can be analysed
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
An object can have a disposition when the revelant conditional is false
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
You believe you existed last year, but your segment doesn't, so they have different beliefs
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
Counterfactuals aren't about actuality, so they lack truthmakers or a supervenience base
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
If 'Fido is possibly black' depends on Fido's counterparts, then it has no actual truthmaker
27. Natural Reality / A. Space-Time / 2. Time / f. Presentism
How can a presentist explain an object's having existed?
Presentists say that things have existed and will exist, not that they are instantaneous
Presentist should deny there is a present time, and just say that things 'exist'
27. Natural Reality / A. Space-Time / 2. Time / i. Time and change
Maybe only presentism allows change, by now having a property, and then lacking it