Ideas from 'Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness'' by U Kriegel / K Williford [2006], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness' (ed/tr Kriegel,U /Williford,K) [MIT 2006,0-262-61211-9]].

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15. Nature of Minds / B. Properties of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
Consciousness is reductively explained either by how it represents, or how it is represented
Experiences can be represented consciously or unconsciously, so representation won't explain consciousness
Red tomato experiences are conscious if the state represents the tomato and itself
How is self-representation possible, does it produce a regress, and is experience like that?
15. Nature of Minds / B. Properties of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
Unfortunately, higher-order representations could involve error