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6891 | Quine's naturalistic and empirical view is based entirely on first-order logic and set theory |

6310 | Enquiry needs a conceptual scheme, so we should retain the best available |

12798 | Plurals can in principle be paraphrased away altogether |

17905 | Any progression will do nicely for numbers; they can all then be used to measure multiplicity |

9556 | Nearly all of mathematics has to quantify over abstract objects |

16462 | The quest for ultimate categories is the quest for a simple clear pattern of notation |

15723 | Either dispositions rest on structures, or we keep saying 'all things being equal' |

15490 | Explain unmanifested dispositions as structural similarities to objects which have manifested them |

8504 | Quine aims to deal with properties by the use of eternal open sentences, or classes |

7924 | The notion of a physical object is by far the most useful one for science |

8464 | Physical objects in space-time are just events or processes, no matter how disconnected |

12136 | Cyclist are not actually essentially two-legged |

8482 | Mathematicians must be rational but not two-legged, cyclists the opposite. So a mathematical cyclist? |

17594 | We can paraphrase 'x=y' as a sequence of the form 'if Fx then Fy' |

15725 | Normal conditionals have a truth-value gap when the antecedent is false. |

15722 | Conditionals are pointless if the truth value of the antecedent is known |

15719 | We feign belief in counterfactual antecedents, and assess how convincing the consequent is |

15720 | What stays the same in assessing a counterfactual antecedent depends on context |

15721 | Counterfactuals are plausible when dispositions are involved, as they imply structures |

15724 | Counterfactuals have no place in a strict account of science |

4630 | Two theories can be internally consistent and match all the facts, yet be inconsistent with one another |

3131 | Quine expresses the instrumental version of eliminativism |

6313 | Stimulus synonymy of 'Gavagai' and 'Rabbit' does not even guarantee they are coextensive |

6317 | Dispositions to speech behaviour, and actual speech, are never enough to fix any one translation |

6311 | The firmer the links between sentences and stimuli, the less translations can diverge |

6312 | We can never precisely pin down how to translate the native word 'Gavagai' |

6314 | Weird translations are always possible, but they improve if we impose our own logic on them |

6315 | We should be suspicious of a translation which implies that a people have very strange beliefs |