Ideas from 'Consciousness' by William Lycan [1987], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Consciousness' by Lycan,William G. [MIT 1995,0-262-62096-0]].

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4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Physicalism requires the naturalisation or rejection of set theory
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Institutions are not reducible as types, but they are as tokens
Types cannot be reduced, but levels of reduction are varied groupings of the same tokens
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
One location may contain molecules, a metal strip, a key, an opener of doors, and a human tragedy
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
I see the 'role'/'occupant' distinction as fundamental to metaphysics
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
I think greenness is a complex microphysical property of green objects
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Intentionality comes in degrees
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Teleological views allow for false intentional content, unlike causal and nomological theories
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
Pain is composed of urges, desires, impulses etc, at different levels of abstraction
The right 'level' for qualia is uncertain, though top (behaviourism) and bottom (particles) are false
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
If energy in the brain disappears into thin air, this breaches physical conservation laws
In lower animals, psychology is continuous with chemistry, and humans are continuous with animals
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Two behaviourists meet. The first says,"You're fine; how am I?"
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Functionalism must not be too abstract to allow inverted spectrum, or so structural that it becomes chauvinistic
If functionalism focuses on folk psychology, it ignores lower levels of function
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
The distinction between software and hardware is not clear in computing
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 5. Teleological Functionalism
Mental types are a subclass of teleological types at a high level of functional abstraction
Teleological characterisations shade off smoothly into brutely physical ones
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Identity theory is functionalism, but located at the lowest level of abstraction
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Teleological functionalism helps us to understand psycho-biological laws
We reduce the mind through homuncular groups, described abstractly by purpose
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
A Martian may exhibit human-like behaviour while having very different sensations
26. Natural Theory / A. Concepts of Nature / 2. Natural Purpose
We need a notion of teleology that comes in degrees
27. Natural Reality / C. Nature of Matter / 1. Modern Matter
'Physical' means either figuring in physics descriptions, or just located in space-time