Ideas from 'Action' by Wilson,G/Schpall,S [2012], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy' (ed/tr Stanford University) [plato.stanford.edu ,-]].
green numbers give full details |
back to texts
|
expand these ideas
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
|
20014
|
Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous
|
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
|
20019
|
Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving
|
|
20021
|
Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it?
|
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
|
20022
|
To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned
|
|
20023
|
If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing
|
|
20025
|
We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed
|
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
|
20031
|
On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires
|
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / d. Group intentions
|
20028
|
Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents
|
|
20027
|
If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment'
|
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / b. Action cognitivism
|
20016
|
Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief
|
|
20017
|
Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief
|
|
20018
|
Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation
|
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
|
20012
|
Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent
|
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
|
20013
|
It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal
|
|
20029
|
Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause
|