Ideas from 'Two Kinds of Possibility' by Dorothy Edgington [2004], by Theme Structure

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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality

12205

There are two families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, of equal strength

			Full Idea: In my view, there are two independent families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, neither stronger than the other.
			From: Dorothy Edgington (Two Kinds of Possibility [2004], Abs)
			A reaction: My immediate reaction is that epistemic necessity is not necessity at all. 'For all I know' 2 plus 2 might really be 95, and squares may also be circular.

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity

12207

Metaphysical possibility is discovered empirically, and is contrained by nature

			Full Idea: Metaphysical necessity derives from distinguishing things which can happen and things which can't, in virtue of their nature, which we discover empirically: the metaphysically possible, I claim, is constrained by the laws of nature.
			From: Dorothy Edgington (Two Kinds of Possibility [2004], §I)
			A reaction: She claims that Kripke is sympathetic to this. Personally I like the idea that natural necessity is metaphysically necessary (see 'Scientific Essentialism'), but the other way round comes as a bit of a surprise. I will think about it.

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity

12206

Broadly logical necessity (i.e. not necessarily formal logical necessity) is an epistemic notion

			Full Idea: So-called broadly logical necessity (by which I mean, not necessarily formal logical necessity) is an epistemic notion.
			From: Dorothy Edgington (Two Kinds of Possibility [2004], §I)
			A reaction: This is controversial, and is criticised by McFetridge and Rumfitt. Fine argues that 'narrow' (formal) logical necessity is metaphysical. Between them they have got rid of logical necessity completely.

12208

An argument is only valid if it is epistemically (a priori) necessary

			Full Idea: Validity is governed by epistemic necessity, i.e. an argument is valid if and only if there is an a priori route from premises to conclusion.
			From: Dorothy Edgington (Two Kinds of Possibility [2004], §V)
			A reaction: Controversial, and criticised by McFetridge and Rumfitt. I don't think I agree with her. I don't see validity as depending on dim little human beings.