Ideas from 'Two Kinds of Possibility' by Dorothy Edgington [2004], by Theme Structure

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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality

12205

There are two families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, of equal strength

			Full Idea: In my view, there are two independent families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, neither stronger than the other.
			From: Dorothy Edgington (Two Kinds of Possibility [2004], Abs)
			A reaction: My immediate reaction is that epistemic necessity is not necessity at all. 'For all I know' 2 plus 2 might really be 95, and squares may also be circular.

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity

12207

Metaphysical possibility is discovered empirically, and is contrained by nature

			Full Idea: Metaphysical necessity derives from distinguishing things which can happen and things which can't, in virtue of their nature, which we discover empirically: the metaphysically possible, I claim, is constrained by the laws of nature.
			From: Dorothy Edgington (Two Kinds of Possibility [2004], §I)
			A reaction: She claims that Kripke is sympathetic to this. Personally I like the idea that natural necessity is metaphysically necessary (see 'Scientific Essentialism'), but the other way round comes as a bit of a surprise. I will think about it.

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity

12208

An argument is only valid if it is epistemically (a priori) necessary

			Full Idea: Validity is governed by epistemic necessity, i.e. an argument is valid if and only if there is an a priori route from premises to conclusion.
			From: Dorothy Edgington (Two Kinds of Possibility [2004], §V)
			A reaction: Controversial, and criticised by McFetridge and Rumfitt. I don't think I agree with her. I don't see validity as depending on dim little human beings.

12206

Broadly logical necessity (i.e. not necessarily formal logical necessity) is an epistemic notion

			Full Idea: So-called broadly logical necessity (by which I mean, not necessarily formal logical necessity) is an epistemic notion.
			From: Dorothy Edgington (Two Kinds of Possibility [2004], §I)
			A reaction: This is controversial, and is criticised by McFetridge and Rumfitt. Fine argues that 'narrow' (formal) logical necessity is metaphysical. Between them they have got rid of logical necessity completely.